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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

~T.\TE OF liT..\ll, h~· and through

its HO.\ D

< <nl
1

:\IISSIOK,

Plaintiff aud Appellant,
-VR.-

Case
No. 9966

FlL\ X K A. \\'OOLLEY, et al.,

Df'lendants and Resw)J/dcuts.

BRIEF O·F AP·P·ELLANT
STATJ1::\IENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and order of the
Third Di~trict Court, in and for Summit County, Utah.
That judgment wa~ based on a verdict rendered in a condemnation lawsuit tried in the district court sitting in
Coahille, Summit County, on April 25, 1963, before the
Honorable ~\. H. Ellett, sitting with a jury. The issues
in the t·a~l' were the compensation to be awarded to defendants for the taking of their land for Highway Project
Xo. 1-~0--!(8) 190, and the necessity for that taking.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit
County entered judgment against the State and in favor
of the respondents in the sum of $20,000. The State of
Utah moved for a remittitur of the verdict and, in the
alternative, a new trial; the trial court denied both
motions.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
It is submitted that the judgment of the District
Court as to the jury verdict of $20,000 should be reversed
and the case remanded for new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts in this matter are not in dispute.
On February 9, 1963, the State Road Commission filed
a complaint in the Third District Court for Summit
County to acquire by eminent domain proceedings real
property owned by the respondents herein, Fank S. \Voolley, et al. An answer was duly filed by the respondents,
thereby joining the issues for trial. The issues raised
were the necessity for taking and the value of the land
taken. Trial was held before the Honorable A. H. Ellett,
sitting with a jury on April 25, 1963. On that same date,
the court affirmed the necessity for taking and the jury
returned its verdict against the State and for the respondents in the sum of $20,000. A Motion for Remittitur
and in the alternative, for New Trial was filed by the
State on May 9, 1963. That Motion was denied by the

2

iJ
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trinl court and this appeal followed.. The property,
owrH·d hy the dt-fPIHlcmts sincP 1D.J-!, (Tr-44) and subjeet
ol' thh~ c·omh•mmttion snit, consists of II acres, more
or h•HH, nnd at the time of taking was being used for
~razin~. storing-, and stockpiling clay. (Tr.-41) It contnitll'd no impro\'ements. It is located hc•tween the prest•nt st:llt• road designated as F. S. Highway 30 and the
r nion Pat·ific Ha ilroad right of way line which runs
pnrnllel to tlw road along the north side of the highway.
'l'ht- propt-rty is a long narrow strip having a depth
\'arying hl'twc•en 500 feet, more or less, and 100 feet,
more or lt•ss, and continues for a distance of approximatl'l~· fin• miles to the Wasateh turn-off. (Tr-11) An
ndjoining parcel of property with a few building impronlmL•nt~ located on the Ftah-\Vyoming border was
purchasl'd hy the StatP of Utah some five years prior to
tlw trial. (Tr-81) As a result, the subject property does
not, and did not at the time of taking, continue to the
stahl line. The project itself is a part of the o\·erall
intt•rstate SO project and involves the widening of the
prt'~l'nt facility. At the trial, the respondents called as
"·itnt>~~t'~ Frank S. \Voolley himself, the defendant, John
.\aron and James Tozer, as evaluation witnesses.

All

three of the respondents' witnesses testified as to the
,·alue of the property taken.

The State called Winston

- @xeiman, a right of "·ay design engineer, to testify as
to the m•cc·~sity of taking. The State then called as evaluation expert witnesses Fred Froerer, Haven Barlow
ano .\lden Adams. In addition, upon motion of state's
coun~L·l.

the jury was permitted to view the property.
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ARGUl\fENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IN EXCLUDING CO~lPARABLE
SALES PRICES WHICH WERE OFFERED
AS EVIDENCE OF VALUE AND AS
OPINION FOUNDATION BY THE STATE'S
EVALUATION EXPERT WITNESS, FRED
FROERER.
In a condemnation lawsuit the jury has the task of
establishing the fair market value of the land taken
(Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 U. 2d, 306, 352 P. 2d
693 (1960). Market value is the price at which property
will sell in the open market free of any compulsive conditions, and actual consummated sales, if made under normal and fair conditions, and if in fact comparable, han
considerable probative merit as to this issue. (State v.
Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953). They also
support, or show the basis for expert opinion. (Ibid.)
In State v. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76,
(1961), a case which also involved a condemniation suit
brought by the State Road Commission, the landowner
appealed to this Court from a jury verdict, setting forth
as prejudicial error the fact that the trial court had refused to permit his expert witness to support an opinion
that the lands in dispute were worth $950.00 per acre
by tesitfying to other sales of land in the locality. This
Court held that the exclusion of the price paid for the
property was error, and stated that it was saved from
being prejudicial only because the price and other facts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
4
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nho11t one of the two eomparahle salPs was Plieitetl on
I'I'O:-IS·t'XHminn tion of t hP ~t fl h• 's witnesses. rrhis Court
ritPd liS authority State , .. /'e('k, 1 e. 2<1 :W:{, 265 P. 2d
ti:IO, ( }!);)::).

In tlwt <'list·, the trial court had excluded, on

both dircet and eross-cxamiuation, eYidence of the pur<·has£' price paid in recent sales of property similar to
pnrts of appellants' propert~-. This, among other factors. wns held to ht> prejudicial error. Speaking specifi<·ally of comparahh• sales prices, this court said:
'• \rit hout this evidence the jury is deprived of a
\·aluahle source of information on the value of
the property, and are greatly handicapped in
e\·nlnating the weight and credibility which should
ht• gi,·en to the opinion e\·idence."
The Court said further that the amount of :-mrh
Pvidenee ean he limited by the trial court, but the amount
on)~-- In the instant case, the trial court excluded the
priee per sP, without conditioning its exclusion upon the
laek of similarity between the property and the subject
property. The transcript reveals the following on direct rxamination of Fred Froerer. Counsel for the State
askPd:

"Q. From your appraisal have you been able
to form an opinion as to the Yalue of the property
taken as of the date of taking, property here in
dispute?
THE CornT: And that date 1s February 14,
1963.

Q. February 1-1:, 1963.
A. Yes,I have.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q. What basis or approach did you use in arriving at this figure or at this appraisal rather
opinion~

A. What

basis~

Q. Yes, what

basis~

A. By comparison to other properties of like
kind and the sale of those properties that han
been evidenced in fact by the recording of the
sale of-or the recording of the deed of transfar
and inquiry with individuals who I assumed to be
acquainted with the market and land in this area.
Q. Could you tell us comparable sales~

did you find such sales,

A. I found on investigation at the Uinta/tCounty, Wyoming, records, if I can consult my notes,
the sale of 180 acres of land adjoining the city of
Evanston on the west, which would be between
the city of Evanston and the Wyoming-Utah border, that a deed was recorded in Book 244, page
136, from Florence B. Elsinore and othersMR. AsHTON : If the Court please, we object to
any other isolated transactions as having no probative value as to the market value of this particular piece of property at any given time, and there
are many other considerations that enter into
transactions.
THE CouRT: That's right, as far as offering
that as proof of value, but he is offering that as
to the source of knowledge, qualification.
?\[R. AsHTON : I don't mind him saying what he
checked into, but as to giving '"hat prices were
paid, I object to that.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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THE Com:T: I didn't understand he was going
to gin· that prirt>. I supposr ~·on wouldn't be
pcrmittrd to, and I didn't know counsel was going
to try to grt that.

MR.

JoHN~oN:

I understand these comparable
salrs an' proper approach in arriving at proper
market value.
THE CouRT: I think it might be brought on
cross-examination, but if that is the thing that
he's based his opinion here on, I suppose that he
is entitled to tell the jury how many such transactions he's checked into and that he's used them
ns a source of knowledge on which he is expressing
his opinion here.
l\f R. AsHTON: I am certain that is correct, Your
Honor, but if he gi,·es any particularization of any
one of these transactions as to price, for the reasoils the court has already given in ruling on my
mattrrs, that is not admissible.

THE CouRT: Let's leave that price out and go
ahead with your examination.

Q. Did you discover a number of comparable
sales, .Mr. Froerer?
. .\. I wouldn't say a number, other than with
an interview with )Ir. Robert Hamlin, the abstractor at Evanston, and in interviewing him,
he had served as an appraiser for the State of
"\Yyoming and for the State of Wyoming and
rtah in regards to the location of a reservoir site
at Randolph, and the lands in particular there
were ronsidered to be comparable to the land in
the subject, and the valuations placed under that
particular project I used in forming an opinion of
the value of this property.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rrhis exclusion by the trial court of comparabl<_,
prices was prejudicial error.

:-;a]p~

POIXT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PRE.Jrl>ICIALLY IN ALLOWI~G THE R~~SPO~DE}JT
TO BRING BEFORE THE .JURY rrHE FA< T
THAT FEDERAL FUNDS WERE TXYOT,VED
IN THE CONDEl\fNATION.
1

1 ~ /__

On cross-examination, counsel for the defendants
injected into the tri@ over objection, the element of
federal participation in this condemnation and its costs
(Tr.-96). It is a fact that federally-aided highway projects in this bridge state are funded in the main by taxes
collected from the more populous regions of the nation
and as a result would affect considerahly less direetly
the pocketbooks of local Utah jurors than a fully statPsupported public project. Hence, the mention of federal
funds in this type of a case is not unlike the mention of
insurance before a jury in a personal injury case. It
in effect sets up a deep pocket out of \\·hich the landowner
can be compensated above and beyond that \vhich he deserves. This, of course, in a personal injury case, is
error. ( r:dtens Y. Lundborg, 3 U. 2d 292, :28-t P. :2d 1113
(1955).)
The federal fund question has been ruled on in
South Carolina. (See Judso/l Y. South Carolina Stat~'
Jligl11cay Department, :2:-w South Carolina 42.J, 11-t S.E.
2d 591, 1960.) In that case, the appellant owned a tract
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~~r

lnnd, n part of which had IJl't>ll condemned by the
Stutt· IIhdl\ray DPpartmeut for inh·rstate right-of-way
p11rpo:o\Pl4. J4,ollowing a trial before a jnr~·, the landowner
a ppt·ult•d, dull'ging inter alia that tlw trial court had
t•ommi t t Pel Prror in refusing to allow in evidence that
t lw highway was la·i ng financed hy the use of funds from
tlw UnitPd ~tatPs Government. The Supreme Court
grantt>1l n JH'W trial, but on other grounds, reasoning as
to the is~·Hll' of federal funds that:

· ·" " • It would have been improper to allow any
Pvidcnce that the federal government was furnishing tlw money in connection with this highway
project. The sole question, if any, was what compensation the appellant 'vaR entitled to for the
taking of his propc>rty for highway purposes.
Sources of funds for the payment of the amount
of the verdict in this case V{as not in issue in this
trial.''
.\:-\ for rtah, this court has stated that the public
:o\Olln'P of funds in a condemnation proceeding is not admissihl<:' as evidc>nce:

'· ·~ • * The fact that the federal government is
participating in the cost * * * has no bearing on
determination of the legal issues involved, and
would not be admissible in evidence.''
13 L".
~d .-Jt), 368 P. :2t1 468 (1962).) Of course, a new trial is
proper when counsel for the adverse party brings in or
attt•mpb to bring in irrelevant evidence upon collateral
mattPrs for the purpose of attempting to prejudice the
jury. ( Spe ;)~) Am. J ur. ''X cw Trial" 65.)
(St'l' Staff' , .. ,'-,'aft Lake City Board of Education,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
9 may contain errors.
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POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY IK
ALLOWING THE LANDO\VNERS TO BRIXO
BEFORE THE JURY, DIRECTLY AND BY
INNUENDO, THE DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED
XEGOTIATIOXS WITH VARIOrR OIL CO~I
PANIES.
It is not competent for a landowner to show to what
use he intended to put property, and the probable future use of the property. (State Y. Tedesco, 4 F. 2d 248,
291 P. 2d 10281 Redondo Beach School District, L. A.
County Y. Flodine, 314 P. 2d 581 (Cal. 1957); Rcdzrood
City Elementary School Dist. Y. Gregory, 272 P. 2d 78
(Cal. 1954); 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, 12.314.) Such
evidence does not tend to show market value and it utterly
disregards the fact that other land might well be purchased at prices determined hy cold and unimaginative
bargaining and by the laws of supply and demand. (See
5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 18.11(2).) In addition,
negotiations, unexecuted agreements, offers to purchase,
and the like, are inadmissible as evidence of value in a
condemnation proceeding. (1 Orgel on Valuatirm Under
the La.w of Eminent Domain, 2d Ed. Ser. 148.) The reasone are apparent. They are not binding on the offeror
or offeree and are of no persuasive effect insofar as determining market value is concerned. That value is to
be determined at least in part by actual arms-length consummated market transactions. (5 Nichols on Emi11P11f
Domain, 21.1.)
The trial court had preYiousl:- and quite properly
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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dl'lermined that an existent partially-executed lease
nKreement form mentioning Standard Oil Company, the
det'emluuts, and a portion of the subjl•et property was
not admi~~ible at trial. However, early in the trial prol't>l'din~ in r·eferring to his activities, defendant Frank
\\"ooh.•y staktl that: "Oh, I endeavored to check with
rnrious oil companies." (Tr-14) The stated moved to
~trike that statement but the court allowed it to stand as
:-;omethiug that might bolster the owner's testimony as to
value. Of course, the only strength it could lend that
ll·~timony is the weight the jury might give to the mention of the oil companies themselves, which in itself is
irrelevant and inadmissible. Counsel for defendants then
:t~kt>d \\'oolll'y if he had had the area surveyed for the
purposp of locating a piece of property which he intended
to ll~t· as a service station. (Tr-16) The state made the
~arne objection, and the court said he would be allowed to
an~WL'l' us to whether a survey was made. (Tr-17) This
is similarly irrelcYaut and draws a step further toward
the least• form itself. Later, counsel for the defendants
askt•d directly if the landowner had negotiated a lease
with ~tandanl Oil, to which the owner responded in the
affirmative. ( Tr-51) The state objected on the ground
that there had been a ruling on the question. The court
ordered the answer stricken but the defendants continuecl
to proceed in the same irrelevant direction. (Tr.-51)
As a result, the defendats managed to bring before
the jury a :'peculative enterprise for which, in their opinion or in the opinion of their experts, the land might be
ll:'l'tl.
Thl'Y basl'tl their estimate of value upon that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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speculation, and bolstered it with the aboYe negotiat.io11~
over the objections of the State. The state \Yas phlr(l<J
in the position of apparently attempting to snpprPs~
significant information.
An attempt hy counsel to bring before the jury matters not properly for the consideration of the jury in disregard of the court's ruling that a certain line of l'YideiH'P
is inadmissible, is grounds for a new trial. Connst>l, in
objecting, is placed in the position of suppressing significant e\·idence and attempting to deceive the jury into
rendering an unjust verdict. (39 Am. Jur. 65 and Collected Cases.)
POINT IV.
THE TESTL\IONY OF THE RESPOXDEXTS'
CASE \VAS INHERENTLY I~IPROBABLE,
AND THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A VERDICT
OF $20,000.
An unqualified \Yitness should not be permitted
to render an opinion, and it is not to be presumed that
a witness is competent to give an opinion. ( 5 Nitlwls on
Eminr:nt Domain18.4(1).)
~Iore particularly, a witness ,dw states his opinion

of market value must be familiar with market value in
the neighborhood of the taking. ( 5 Nichols 011 Eminrilf
JJomain 18.2(2).)
The first evaluation \vitness used by the respondent:-,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.John .Auron, evidPnced his lack of qualifications under
voir dire. I (p had done no selling in Utah, no appraising
in l'tah, and no fpp appraiHing whatsoever. He hadn't
lin•d in t'tah for~;~ ~·pars past. (Tr-:>7-58) Factors afft•ding- \Yyoming and etah property value, such as tax
lt>\'t>ls, the general condition of the economy, level of
i ~~~·om~·. and ability to pay, all could easily be decidedly
~[ r. .\ron was clearly not acquainted with
vnrinnt.
markPt eomlition~ in Utah, and as a result, is not an expet a:-~ to l'tah market Yalue .
.\ n opinion based upon knowledge acquired long before the date as of which property is to be evaluated, is
snhjeet to l'X('lu~ion. (5 Nichols oil Eminent Domain,
lS.-!(2).)
The respondents' second evaluation witness, James
·rozer. does not meet that test of expertness insofar as
th subject property is concerned. He made his appraisal
and formed his opinion some years before this land was
taken and was even unaware that the property directly
upon the state line itself was no longer part of this
property. and no longer usable for private commercial
purposes. (Tr-64 and G7) His opinion was based upon
knowled~e acquired long before the date as of whieh the
property was to be evaluated, and that property was to
he ,·alued for the purposes of this suit as of the date of
takin~. \·"'fate Road C'nmmission v. ralellfille, 10 U. 2d
t:~~~ :~4~) P. :2d 321 (1960).) As a result, his testimony
eould not be persuasive as a matter of law in that it was
not ha~l'll on a timely examination of the property. ConSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cededly, there is considerable discretion in the trial court
as to the exclusion of expert testimony, but certainl~, the
quality of this testimony is not impressiYe, and prohnbly
merited exclusion.
The only other evidence presented by the defendnnts
was the testimony of the defendant, Frank S. Woolley,
himself. Quoting from the general law on the subject a~
set out in 5 Nichols on, Eminent Domain, 18.4(3):
It is generally understood that the opinion of the
owner of the land is so far afflicted h~r bias that it
amounts to little more than a definite statement of
the maximum figure of his contention.''
The $10,000 figure added to his testimony is even more
luvidly exposed as weightless in that he himself says
he wasn't qualified to render it. (Tr-22) That $10,000
figure is the only figure placed on the land rlassed as
agricultural by the defendants, and is so inherently unbelievable that the $20,000 award must certainly have
been based on the value of the small parcel characterized
by the defendants as service station property. Twenty
thousand dollars is outside the bounds of a reasonahlc
award for that type of land taken. It is especiall~' incredible in that it was based on the testimony of three
men, one of whom had no familiarity '''ith the property at
the time of taking, another who had no familiarity with
the Utah market, and the third a defendant in the lawsuit
Even the theory advanced by the defendants was
spurious. There exists many miles of this highway frontage from which a prospective buyer could choose (Tr-77);
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tlu·n·l'on·, thL•re was no particular premium for this
P~'~'l~~'rty, whil'h "·as <·Ht off from the border at the time
of tnking, and was Hot a developed border area. ( Tr-81)
\\'(• submit that tlw tiH•ory and testimony of there:-;polldPnts is incredible and a new trial can be granted
when• dispuh·d testimony is incredible, impossible, or improhahlP. (39 .\m .•Jur. "Xew Trial.")

The judgment of the lower court, by reason of error
rommitted during the trial of the case, and the inherent
improbability of respondent's testimony, should be re,.Prsl'd, insofar as the jury verdict of $20,000 is concerned,
and should be remanded to such court for new trial on
the issnl' of .inst compensation.
Hl'SlH'rtfnll~·

submitted,

~\. PR~\ TT

!{ESLER

.Attorney General
XOR~L\.N"

S. JOHNSON

Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT S. CA1IPBELL, JR.
Special Assistant Attornev
General
o!

Attorneys for .Appellant
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